Passkeys for work

A security key that's always with you.

Qey turns your phone into a hardware security key, like a YubiKey you never forget at home. Your passkeys are created inside the phone's secure chip and can never be copied, synced or backed up.

  • Android and iOS
  • No cloud, no server
  • Face ID, fingerprint or PIN for every use

Why Qey

Passkeys that stay where they were made

Passkeys replace passwords with a key pair: the site keeps the public key, and your device keeps the private key. Who else can get hold of that private key decides how much a passkey is worth.

Synced passkeys travel

Password managers copy passkeys to the cloud and to every device on your account. That's convenient at home, but a company can't tell where a copy has ended up.

Hardware keys get left behind

Security keys like a YubiKey keep the key in one place, but they must be bought, shipped, carried and replaced, and they're easy to forget at home.

Qey is both

The guarantees of a hardware key, in the phone you already carry. The key is made in the phone's secure chip and never leaves it.

At a glance

How Qey compares

Feature Synced passkeys Hardware security key Qey
Private key can be copied Yes, to the cloud and other devices No No, it never leaves the secure chip
Included in backups Yes No No
Always with you Yes Only if you remember it Yes, it's your phone
Extra hardware to buy None One or two keys per person None
Signs in on a laptop Yes Yes, by USB or NFC Yes, by scanning a QR code
If the device is lost Restore from the cloud Use a spare key, or enrol again Enrol again with your company

How it works

Three steps, no new habits

Qey plugs into the passkey system built into Android and iOS, so sites and apps work with it the way they already work with passkeys.

Turn on Qey

Install the app and turn it on as a passkey provider: in AutoFill & Passwords on iOS, or in Passwords, passkeys & accounts on Android.

Create a passkey

On your company's sign-in or security page, choose to add a passkey and pick Qey. The key is generated in the secure chip and never leaves it.

Sign in anywhere

Approve with Face ID, a fingerprint or your PIN. On a laptop, scan the QR code with your phone and approve there: the key stays on the phone.

Security design

Built so the key can't leave the phone

Each protection is enforced by the phone's hardware or operating system, not just by Qey's own code.

Made in the secure chip

Keys are generated in the Secure Enclave on iPhone, and in StrongBox or the Trusted Execution Environment on Android. They can't be exported, even by Qey.

No sync, no backup

Keys are never synchronizable. Qey reads each new key's settings back and refuses it unless it's bound to this device. Device backup and transfer are blocked too.

You approve every use

Every signature needs Face ID, a fingerprint, or the phone's passcode. The secure chip enforces this, so nothing signs silently.

Locked app

Opening Qey needs the same check. It locks again as soon as it leaves the screen, and hides its content in the app switcher.

No server, no account

Qey runs no server and has no account to create. Nothing about your passkeys is sent anywhere: the site only ever receives a signature.

Right site only

A passkey only works for the site it was made for. Phishing pages on look-alike addresses can't use it, because the phone checks the real site before asking you.

By design

Lost your phone? Your company enrols you again.

Because there's no copy anywhere, a lost or replaced phone means its passkeys are gone for good. That's the point: nobody can restore them, not even you. Your company's usual recovery process enrols the new phone, the same way it would replace a lost security key.

  1. Phone lost or replaced. Its passkeys can't be recovered from any backup.

  2. An admin removes the old passkey from your account, so it can't be used even if the phone turns up.

  3. You verify your identity with your company's usual recovery steps.

  4. You create a new passkey with Qey on the new phone.

Android & iOS

One design, two platforms

Both apps follow the same rules wherever the platform allows it. The differences come from what Android and iOS let a passkey provider do.

Android Android 14+

Secure chip
StrongBox when present, otherwise the Trusted Execution Environment
Approval
Strong biometric, or the phone's PIN, pattern or password
Backup flags
Not set: sites see the passkey as device-bound
Attestation
android-key when the site asks, otherwise none
Who may ask
Browsers on an allowlist, and apps the site authorizes through Digital Asset Links

iOS iOS 17+

Secure chip
Secure Enclave
Approval
Face ID, Touch ID or the device passcode
Backup flags
Set, because iOS requires it (see below)
Attestation
None
Who may ask
Checked by iOS itself: the site's origin, or the app's associated domains

About the backup flags on iOS. A passkey tells the site whether it could be backed up. iOS refuses any passkey from a third-party app unless it says yes, so Qey on iOS has to set these flags. The key itself still never leaves the Secure Enclave and is never synced or backed up. Sites can tell Qey passkeys apart by their AAGUID, the identifier each passkey app puts in its passkeys.

Attestation

Why attestation isn't set up yet

When a passkey is created, a site can ask for attestation: a certificate, signed by someone the site trusts, saying which kind of authenticator made the key and how it's protected. Most sites don't ask for it. Some companies make it mandatory, so that only approved authenticators can be enrolled.

Today on Android

When a site asks, Qey returns an android-key statement. The phone's hardware signs a certificate chain proving the key lives in secure hardware. Many identity providers accept it, but not all.

Today on iOS

Qey returns no attestation. Apple gives apps no way to get an Apple-signed certificate for a Secure Enclave key. App Attest proves the app is genuine, but not the passkey, and it needs a server to check it.

What strict policies need

Identity providers that enforce attestation, such as Microsoft Entra ID, expect a packed statement chaining to a certificate authority listed in the FIDO Metadata Service, plus FIDO certification.

Why we haven't built it. A packed statement needs a certificate authority run by Qey: a server that checks each phone, for example with App Attest or Android's key attestation, and then issues certificates. Qey is deliberately serverless, so this would change its design, and FIDO certification is a separate process. For now, companies whose identity provider enforces attestation can't use Qey. Companies that don't enforce it, which is the default, can use Qey today. We'll revisit this if attestation turns out to be required in practice.

FAQ

Questions

Can Qey see or export my keys?

No. The private key is created inside the secure chip and can only be used there, to sign after you approve. Qey stores only labels: the site, your user name and an ID.

What happens if I restore my phone from a backup?

Your passkeys won't come back. Their keys are bound to the original phone's secure chip, and on iOS a backup copy of the key reference is useless on any other device. You enrol again with your company.

Can I use Qey on my laptop?

Yes. When a site on your laptop asks for a passkey, choose to use a phone, scan the QR code, and approve on the phone. The phone signs, and the key never leaves it.

Does Qey replace my password manager?

No. Qey only handles passkeys, and only those meant to stay on one device. Keep your password manager for everything else.

Does Qey work with any site that supports passkeys?

Yes, with any site that accepts the standard ES256 passkey algorithm, which nearly all do. Sites that require attestation from approved authenticators are the exception, as explained above.

Does Qey need an internet connection?

Qey on iOS makes no network requests at all. On Android, Qey reads a site's Digital Asset Links file when a native app asks for a passkey, to check that the app may act for that site. It never sends key data.

Status

A working prototype

Both apps create passkeys and sign in, on the phone and on a laptop by QR code. They're in testing and not yet in the App Store or Google Play.

  • Android: tested on a Galaxy S23 with Android 17
  • iOS: tested on an iPhone 16 Pro with iOS 27.2, through TestFlight
  • Planned: auditing a YubiKey backup over NFC, and settings managed by a company's MDM
  • Not built: attestation trusted by strict identity providers (see above)